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Article 
The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in 
Connecticut: A Case Study  
THOMAS A. BISHOP 
Judges have been required to interpret statutes for as long as there have been 
legislative enactments.  To perform this task, courts have adopted various canons 
to guide their analytical paths.  One of these judicially-created canons, the plain 
meaning rule, has been subjected to praise as an indication of the court's 
subordination to legislative will and criticism as wooden and inadequate to the 
task of implementing legislative intent.  Until mid-twentieth century, the debate 
about the efficacy of the plain meaning rule largely took place in opinion writing 
and legal scholarship.  But as the debate has shifted to a broader discussion of the 
role of the court in the legislative process, Connecticut and seven sister states' 
legislatures have joined the fray to assert a legislative primacy in statutory 
interpretation. 
In 2004, the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Courchesne, was required 
to interpret a portion of the State’s death penalty statute, and, even though 
unnecessary to its holding, the court expressly abandoned the plain meaning rule 
in favor of a purposive approach.  In the process, the court formulated a strict 
version of the rule unlike its recent application in either Connecticut or U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions and postulated the canon as a rule of law.  In quick 
order, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted a plain meaning rule akin to the 
textualism espoused by Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.  As a consequence 
of this legislative response, Connecticut judges are now constrained by a 
legislative mandate forbidding judges from consulting beyond the facially plain 
and unambiguous text of statutes.  Whether this legislative response to Courchesne 
will be an aid to sound statutory interpretation in Connecticut remains to be seen. 
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The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in 
Connecticut: A Case Study 
THOMAS A. BISHOP ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the Connecticut Supreme Court renounced the plain meaning 
rule as a guide to statutory interpretation1 in State v. Courchesne,2 and 
adopted, in its place, a purposive path to interpretation against a strong 
dissent that argued for adherence to a rigid form of the plain meaning rule.3  
Perceiving the Courchesne opinion to reflect judicial disrespect for its 
legislative primacy, the Connecticut General Assembly quickly enacted a 
plain meaning statute requiring courts to adhere to a rigid form of the plain 
meaning canon not previously embraced by either the Connecticut or U.S. 
Supreme Courts.4  In doing so, the Connecticut General Assembly elevated 
a loosely based guide to a rule of law, and adopted an approach to statutory 
interpretation most notably associated with the textualism of Justice 
Antonin Scalia.5  As a consequence, Connecticut became the eighth state 
whose judiciary operates under a legislative mandate to follow a version of 
the plain meaning rule.  This swift and pointed legislative reaction to 
Courchesne reflects a competitive sensitivity to the court’s role in statutory 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Judge of the Connecticut Appellate Court.  I am grateful to Attorneys Kristi Mallett and Kirsten 
Rigney for their assistance in the preparation of this Article, for their wise suggestions and graceful 
subtractions without which this Article would have been longer and less useful. 
1 This Article uses the terms “construction” and “interpretation” interchangeably in accordance 
with the practice of most current writers. 
2 State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 568, 582 (Conn. 2003), superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 1-2z (2007), as recognized in Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 937 A.2d 24, 33 n.12 (Conn. 2007).   
3 See Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 609–18 (Zarella, J., dissenting) (arguing for adherence to the plain 
meaning rule and outlining the disadvantages of a purposive interpretation approach as embraced by 
the majority). 
4 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2007) (“The meaning of a statute shall . . . be ascertained from 
the text of the statute itself . . . .”); see also Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 576–77 (“For at least a century, 
this court has relied on sources beyond the specific text of the statute at issue to determine the meaning 
of the language as intended by the legislature.”). 
5 Textualism, as espoused by Justice Scalia, is the notion that the meaning of a statute is to be 
understood by its language and by its statutory context without reference to legislative history, because 
that is an unreliable guide to the meaning of enacted language.  See, e.g., John F. Manning, What 
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73–75 (explaining Justice Scalia’s 
textualist interpretation philosophy).  An alternative approach, known as purposivism, holds that 
although the language of a statute may have primacy, judges in their interpretative role may consult 
extrinsic sources, including legislative history, to understand what the legislature intended in enacting 
the legislation under scrutiny.  Id. at 85–109 (describing the main differences between purposivism and 
textualism while also noting the similarities between the two methods of statutory interpretation). 
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interpretation without regard to whether rote adherence to statutory text is, 
in fact, the most effective approach to determining legislative intent.  
Nevertheless, the adoption by Connecticut and seven sister states of plain 
meaning statutes is a telling indication of legislative intervention in what 
historically has been an ongoing and lively dialogue among judges and 
scholars regarding the best approach to statutory adjudication in an 
increasingly statutory age.6 
This Article reviews the majority’s formulation and rejection of the 
plain meaning rule in Courchesne, and compares the version of the rule 
articulated by Courchesne with the rule’s historic treatment in U.S. 
Supreme Court and Connecticut Supreme Court opinions.  The Article then 
explores the nature of the plain meaning rule as an interpretative canon, 
observing that the debate about the usefulness of the canon as a linguistic 
guide has been superseded by a more philosophical debate about the role of 
courts in statutory cases.  Next, the Article examines the swift proscriptive 
response to Courchesne by the Connecticut Legislature, while noting that 
other states have enacted plain meaning legislation as well.  The Article 
concludes with questions that legislative adoption of plain meaning statutes 
leave unanswered regarding the role of courts in statutory interpretation 
and, more generally, in the legislative process. 
II.  STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. COURCHESNE 
In 2003, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided a significant question 
that arose in the case of State v. Courchesne.7  Robert Courchesne was 
convicted by a three judge panel of two counts each of murder and capital 
felony in connection with the stabbing deaths of a mother and her unborn 
child who, subsequent to the stabbing, was delivered by cesarean section, 
but was pronounced dead forty-two days later due to oxygen deprivation to 
the brain.8  In conjunction with its prosecution, the state filed notice with 
the court that it intended to present evidence in the penalty phase that, as 
an aggravating factor, the defendant committed the “offense” of capital 
felony in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, thus making the 
defendant eligible for the imposition of the death penalty.9  Although the 
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss this aggravating factor, it 
                                                                                                                          
6 This Article discusses the enactment of plain meaning statutes in Connecticut and other states. 
While observing this phenomenon, the Article refrains from any discussion of the constitutionality of 
such statutes. 
7 State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 567 (Conn. 2003). 
8 Id. at 566–68.  In Connecticut, a capital felony includes the “murder of two or more persons at 
the same time or in the course of a single transaction.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b(7) (2007). 
9 See Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 566–67 (noting the main issue before the court in interpreting the 
State’s death penalty statute).  Connecticut's death penalty statute provides, in part, that one of the 
aggravating factors to be considered in death penalty litigation is evidence that “the defendant 
committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
46a(i)(4). 
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ruled that the imposition of the death penalty required proof that each 
murder was committed in the aggravated manner.10 
On appeal, a divided Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state 
was required only to prove that the defendant killed one of the victims in 
an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner in furtherance of its 
intention to seek the death penalty.11  Turning initially to the language of 
the statute, the court observed that literal application of the term “offense,” 
as “a purely linguistic matter,” favored the defendant’s argument that in 
order to be eligible for the death penalty, the state would have to prove that 
each murder was committed in the aggravated manner claimed because the 
offense for which the defendant was convicted was the murder of two 
persons.12  Reciprocally, the court noted that the state’s plain language 
argument was not as “linguistically appealing.”13  Nevertheless, the court 
concluded: 
Although the language of the statute, viewed literally and in 
isolation, suggests a conclusion consistent with the 
interpretation offered by the defendant, when viewed in its 
context and history leads us to conclude, to the contrary, that 
when § 53a-46a(i)(4) refers to ‘the offense,’ as applied in the 
circumstances of the present case, it means the murder of 
either of the ‘two’ persons referred to in § 53a-54b(8), and 
does not mean both murders.14 
Following this determination, the court surveyed Connecticut’s 
statutory scheme for death penalty eligibility, and noted that most of the 
predicate conduct for death penalty eligibility involved one underlying 
offense.15  The court concluded that there could be no legislative rationale 
for making one eligible for the death penalty who had committed one 
                                                                                                                          
10 See Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 567 (“In the course of its decision . . . the [trial] court . . . ruled 
that . . . the state . . . would be required to prove . . . both murders were committed in an especially 
heinous, cruel or depraved manner.”). 
11 E.g., id. at 568 (“We conclude that, under our death penalty statutory scheme, if the defendant’s 
mental state and conduct meet these requirements with respect to one of his victims, the aggravating 
factor is satisfied.”).  Although, generally, the State has no right of appeal in a criminal matter, the trial 
court in Connecticut has the discretion to permit the State to appeal upon motion.  E.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-96 (2001) (“Appeals from the rulings of the . . . superior court, upon all questions of law 
arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with the permission of the presiding 
judge, to the supreme court or to the appellate court . . . .”).  Additionally, Connecticut has a statutory 
procedure enabling a party to seek review of an interlocutory order under specified circumstances.  
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-265a (2005) (“[A]ny party . . . who is aggrieved by an order . . . of the 
superior court . . . in an action which involves a matter of substantial public interest and in which delay 
may work a substantial injustice, may appeal . . . to the supreme court . . . .”). 
12 Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 569. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 570. 
15 See id. at 570–72 (outlining the statutory context of state provisions providing for imposition of 
the death penalty in finding that most underlying predicate conduct need only arise from a single 
offense). 
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underlying offense in an aggravated manner, but not one who had 
committed the offense of two murders in a similar manner.16  The court 
determined that a literal application of the statute’s language would result 
in a bizarre outcome because double murderers might not be exposed to the 
death penalty even though those guilty of one underlying offense could be 
made eligible by proof of a requisite aggravating factor.17  Thus, the court 
concluded that the legislature intended that one who commits double 
murder in an aggravated manner is eligible for the death penalty without 
proof that each of the underlying murders was committed in that manner.18 
Following its resolution of the issue at hand, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court launched an attack against the plain meaning rule.19  Even though the 
court recognized that it had previously applied various versions of the 
rule,20 the court postulated a rigid formulation of the rule as its essence. 21  
Then, finding this approach to statutory interpretation to be untenable, the 
court renounced the plain meaning rule in any of its various manifestations 
as a viable approach to statutory interpretation.22  Additionally, and 
contrary to previous decisional law, the court characterized the plain 
meaning canon as a rule of law.23  The court posited that: 
Although we have used many different formulations of the 
plain meaning rule, all of them have in common the 
fundamental premise, stated generally, that, where the 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court must 
stop its interpretive process with that language; there is in 
such a case no room for interpretation; and, therefore, in such 
a case, the court must not go beyond that language.24 
                                                                                                                          
16 Id. at 572 (“We can conceive of no rationale for the legislature to have set a higher bar to the 
imposition of the death penalty when the underlying capital felony involved, not one, but two 
underlying serious felonies . . . .”). 
17 See id. at 572–73 (discussing the counter-intuitive result that would accompany a literal 
interpretation of the statute’s meaning in these circumstances). 
18 Id. at 574 (“We decline, therefore, to apply [strict] rules so as to yield the result that the 
aggravating factor must apply to both murders.”). 
19 See id. at 576–77 (“We take this opportunity to clarify the approach of this court to the process 
of statutory interpretation.  For at least a century, this court has relied on sources beyond the specific 
text of the statute at issue to determine the meaning of the language as intended by the legislature.”). 
20 See id. at 577 (“We have not been consistent in our formulation of the appropriate method of 
interpreting statutory language.”). 
21 See id. at 580–82 (“Although we have used many different formulations of the plain meaning 
rule, all of them have in common the fundamental premise, stated generally, that, where the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, the court must stop its interpretive process with that language . . . 
.”) (emphasis added). 
22 Id. at 582 (“We now make explicit what is implicit in what we have already said: in performing 
the process of statutory interpretation, we do not follow the plain meaning rule in whatever formulation 
it may appear.”). 
23 See id. (describing the authoritative implications of the plain meaning rule in relation to judicial 
review of statutory language). 
24 Id. at 580. 
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The court added: 
The plain meaning rule means that in a certain category 
of cases—namely, those in which the court first determines 
that the language at issue is plain and unambiguous—the 
court is precluded as a matter of law from going beyond the 
text of that language to consider any extratextual evidence of 
the meaning of that language, no matter how persuasive that 
evidence might be.  Indeed, the rule even precludes reference 
to that evidence where that evidence, if consulted, would 
support or confirm that plain meaning.25 
The court recapped its view of the plain meaning rule as follows: 
If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and if 
the result yielded by that plain and unambiguous meaning is 
not absurd or unworkable, the court must not interpret the 
language (i.e., there is no room for construction); instead, the 
court’s sole task is to apply that language literally to the facts 
of the case, and it is precluded as a matter of law from 
consulting any extratextual sources regarding the meaning of 
the language at issue.  Furthermore, in deciding whether the 
language is plain and unambiguous, the court is confined to 
what may be regarded as the objective meaning of the 
language used by the legislature, and may not inquire into 
what the legislature may have intended the language to 
mean—that is, it may not inquire into the purpose or 
purposes for which the legislature used the language.  
Finally, the plain meaning sets forth a set of thresholds of 
ambiguity or uncertainty, and the court must surmount each 
of those thresholds in order to consult additional sources of 
meaning of the language of the statute.  Thus, whatever may 
lie beyond any of those thresholds may in any given case be 
barred from consideration by the court, irrespective of its 
ultimate usefulness in ascertaining the meaning of the 
statutory language at issue.26 
While acknowledging by footnote that it had not always utilized this 
formulation of the plain meaning rule, the court concluded this portion of 
the opinion declaring: “We now make explicit what is implicit in what we 
have already said: in performing the process of statutory interpretation, we 
do not follow the plain meaning rule in whatever formulation it may 
                                                                                                                          
25 Id. at 581. 
26 Id. at 582. 
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appear.”27 
In place of the plain meaning rule, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
adopted a purposive approach to statutory interpretation by following the 
analytical pathway it had earlier enunciated in the case of Bender v. 
Bender.28  There, the court opined: 
The process of statutory interpretation involves a 
reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.  In other 
words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the 
meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of 
this case, including the question of whether the language 
actually does apply.  In seeking to determine that meaning, 
we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative 
history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the 
legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its 
relationship to existing legislation and common law 
principles governing the same general subject matter.29 
To this formulation, the Courchesne court added the following: “We 
also now make explicit that we ordinarily will consider all of those sources 
beyond the language itself, without first having to cross any threshold of 
ambiguity of the language.”30  By footnote, the Courchesne majority noted: 
“We acknowledge at the outset that the particular approach to the judicial 
process of statutory interpretation, as formulated and explained herein, that 
we now specifically adopt, has not been adopted in the same specific 
formulation by any other court in the nation.”31  In response, the dissent 
observed: “[T]he majority's abandonment of the plain meaning rule in 
favor of an alternative and novel method of statutory interpretation 
represents an incorrect deviation from our traditional mode of statutory 
                                                                                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 585 (“[I]n applying the Bender formulation, we necessarily employ a kind of sliding 
scale: the more strongly the bare text of the language suggests a particular meaning, the more 
persuasive the extratextual sources will have to be in order for us to conclude that the legislature 
intended a different meaning.”) (citing Bender v. Bender, 785 A.2d 197 (Conn. 2001)). 
29 Bender, 785 A.2d at 205 (citations omitted). 
30 State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 578 (Conn. 2003).  It is noteworthy that the court’s assault 
on the plain meaning rule had no apparent connection to its holding.  And, as can be noted from the 
review of cases discussed in this Article, the case could have been decided with the same result by 
application of the plain meaning rule as it traditionally has been utilized in Connecticut and by the U.S. 
Supreme Court because the plain meaning rule, in any formulation, permits resort to extrinsic sources if 
a literal application of the statute’s language would lead to an absurd result.  The court’s finding that 
the application of the term “offense” in the manner suggested by the defendant would lead to a bizarre 
result would have permitted the court’s search of extrinsic sources without the need to renounce the 
plain meaning rule.  Id. at 573. 
Similarly, in none of the cases cited in Courchesne for “eschewing” plain meaning analysis does 
it appear that the statute under scrutiny had either plain or unambiguous meaning.  One could 
reasonably conclude that, in those cases, the court did not deal with the plain meaning rule because its 
inapplicability was plain. 
31 Id. at 576 n.19. 
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interpretation and an impermissible usurpation of the legislative 
function.”32 
Neither the majority’s postulation of the plain meaning rule and its 
statement of the uniqueness of its purposive approach, nor the dissent’s 
characterization of the majority’s approach as a novel deviation from the 
court’s traditional analytical pathway find support in the history of U.S. 
Supreme Court or Connecticut Supreme Court statutory interpretation 
jurisprudence. 
III.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
A survey of U.S. Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases reveals 
no consistent philosophical thread.  At times, the Court appears to have 
adhered to one version or another of the plain meaning rule.  In other cases, 
the Court appears to have taken a purposive approach without regard to the 
plain meaning rubric. 
An early expression of the plain meaning rule by the U.S. Supreme 
Court can be found in United States v. Wiltberger.33  There, Chief Justice 
John Marshall commented in regard to the construction of statutes: 
The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the 
words they employ.  Where there is no ambiguity in the 
words, there is no room for construction.  The case must be a 
strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing 
from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in 
search of an intention which the words themselves did not 
suggest.34 
In Wiltberger, Marshall followed this analytical pathway in 
determining that the ordinary meaning of the term “high seas” did not 
encompass a river in a foreign country.35  As a consequence, the Court did 
not have cognizance over an alleged murder committed upon another 
country’s river since a river is not, in common parlance, a part of the “high 
seas.”36 
Notwithstanding Wiltberger, and without reference to it, Justice 
                                                                                                                          
32 Id. at 597 (Zarella, J., dissenting). 
33 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95–96 (1820). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 103–06. 
36 Id. at 105–06.  In its adherence to plain meaning, the Marshall Court adopted the “faithful agent 
theory” through which the Court viewed itself as being the agent of Congress to carry out its express 
intent.  One commentator observed that Marshall’s approach at this juncture in the Court’s history was 
a departure from colonial decisions in which many courts carried over from England the notion that the 
interpretative task of the court was to construe language in a manner to make the outcome equitable, an 
idea rooted in much earlier English jurisprudence.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of 
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79 (2001) (discussing federal courts that applied the equity of the 
statute to construe statutory meaning). 
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Harlan, speaking for the court fifty-nine years later in Oates v. National 
Bank, suggested that: “The duty of the court, being satisfied of the 
intention of the legislature, clearly expressed in a constitutional enactment, 
is to give effect to that intention, and not to defeat it by adhering too rigidly 
to the mere letter of the statute, or to technical rules of construction.”37  
The Court further opined,  
A thing which is within the intention of the makers of a 
statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the 
letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is 
not within the statute unless it be within the meaning of the 
makers.38   
It is noteworthy that both the Marshall and the Harlan Courts were 
unanimous in their seemingly contradictory analytical routes. 
The Court, in 1917, returned to a view of statutory construction more 
consonant with Marshall’s expression in Wiltberger.  In Caminetti v. 
United States, the Court was called upon to construe the language of the 
White Slave Trade Act, and, in particular, the meaning of the phrase, “any 
other immoral purpose.”39  Eschewing an argument that the phrase should 
not be accorded its plain meaning but should be read more restrictively, the 
Court embraced the plain meaning rule, stating: 
[A]s we have already said, and it has been so often affirmed 
as to become a recognized rule, when words are free from 
doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the 
legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted 
from by considerations drawn from titles or designating 
names or reports accompanying their introduction, or from 
any extraneous source. In other words, the language being 
plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable 
consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate 
legislative intent.40 
Just eleven years later, in Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 
the Court appeared to retreat from this approach in assessing whether the 
government should be liable for interest on damages due to a private ship 
owner involved in an at-sea collision with a naval destroyer.41  Declining to 
accord the statute its plain meaning, Justice Holmes spoke for a divided 
Court in commenting: 
                                                                                                                          
37 Oates v. Nat’l Bank, 100 U.S. 239, 244 (1879). 
38 Id. (citation omitted). 
39 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 476 (1917). 
40 Id. at 490. 
41 Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). 
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It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are 
not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is 
rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not 
preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists. If 
Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a 
more limited meaning than might be attributed to it by 
common practice, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider 
that fact when we come to interpret a statute.42 
Writing for a minority of four, Justice Sutherland decried the 
majority’s approach as inconsistent with prior jurisprudence: 
To refuse interest in this case, in my opinion, is 
completely to change the clear meaning of the words 
employed by Congress by invoking the aid of extrinsic 
circumstances to import into the statute an ambiguity which 
otherwise does not exist and thereby to set at naught the prior 
decisions of this Court and long established canons of 
statutory construction.43 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of Boston Sand, one year later the Court, 
in United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., opined: “[W]here the 
language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms 
does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words 
employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning 
intended.”44 
If Caminetti and Missouri Pacific can be seen as the high-water mark 
for plain meaning, the doctrine was dealt a severe blow just eleven years 
after Missouri Pacific in United States v. American Trucking Associations, 
                                                                                                                          
42 Id.  Justice Holmes’ characterization of the plain meaning rule as an “axiom of experience” is 
an often-repeated phrase, frequently cited by courts seeking an analytical path not constrained by strict 
adherence to either a rigid formulation of the rule or to the notion that it is a rule of law at all.  See e.g., 
Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989) (“Looking beyond the naked 
text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where 
it seems inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain meaning rule is rather an axiom of 
experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(discussing and implementing the principle of axiom of experience as proposed by Justice Holmes); 
Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 312 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Justice Holmes’ language); 
Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d. 685, 700 n.17 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing Supreme 
Court plain meaning precedent); Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 973 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(beginning its legislative history analysis with the “axiom of experience” language); In re Continental 
Airline, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 287 (3rd Cir. 1991) (justifying the addition of “extrinsic aids to 
interpretation” based on Justice Holmes’ language); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d. 623, 625 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (noting that statutory analysis does not end at the language of the statute based on Justice 
Holmes’ language); United States v. Wallington, 889 F.2d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1989) (considering 
evidence beyond the plain meaning of the statute by reason of Justice Holmes’ understanding of the 
law). 
43 Boston Sand & Gravel Co., 278 U.S. at 55 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
44 United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). 
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in which Justice Reed, writing for a majority of five, declined to accord the 
term “employee,” as used in the 1935 Motor Carrier Act, its common 
meaning on the basis that such a reading of the term would cause a result at 
variance with the policy of the act.45  Speaking of the Court’s interpretative 
function, Justice Reed reasoned: 
In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts 
is easily stated.  It is to construe the language so as to give 
effect to the intent of Congress.  There is no invariable rule 
for the discovery of that intention.  To take a few words from 
their context and with them thus isolated to attempt to 
determine their meaning, certainly would not contribute 
greatly to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a 
statute, particularly in a law drawn to meet many needs of a 
major occupation. 
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the 
purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature 
undertook to give expression to its wishes.  Often these 
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the 
purpose of the legislation.  In such cases we have followed 
their plain meaning.  When that meaning has led to absurd or 
futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the 
words to the purpose of the act.  Frequently, however, even 
when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but 
merely an unreasonable one plainly at variance with the 
policy of the legislation as a whole this Court has followed 
that purpose, rather than the literal words.  When aid to 
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, 
is available, there certainly can be no rule of law which 
forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 
superficial examination.  The interpretation of the meaning of 
statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively 
a judicial function.  This duty requires one body of public 
servants, the judges, to construe the meaning of what another 
body, the legislators, has said.  Obviously there is danger that 
the courts’ conclusion as to legislative purpose will be 
unconsciously influenced by the judges’ own views or by 
factors not considered by the enacting body.  A lively 
appreciation of the danger is the best assurance of escape 
from its threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a literal 
interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts 
                                                                                                                          
45 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'n., 310 U.S. 534, 553 (1940). 
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available information for reaching a correct conclusion.  
Emphasis should be laid, too, upon the necessity for appraisal 
of the purposes as a whole of Congress in analyzing the 
meaning of clauses or sections of general acts.  A few words 
of general connotation appearing in the text of statutes should 
not be given a wide meaning, contrary to a settled policy, 
excepting as a different purpose is plainly shown.46 
Given the scope of Justice Reed's language, it is understandable that 
American Trucking has become a vanguard opinion for those who espouse 
a purposive analytical route. 
In the same Term, the Court decided United States v. Dickerson, in 
which, once again, the Court’s manner of statutory interpretation was at 
issue.47  There, the Court implicitly rejected a formalistic plain meaning 
approach to interpretation and commented: 
It would be anomalous to close our minds to persuasive 
evidence of intention on the ground that reasonable men 
could not differ as to the meaning of the words.  Legislative 
materials may be without probative value, or contradictory, 
or ambiguous, it is true, and in such cases will not be 
permitted to control the customary meaning of words or 
overcome rules of syntax or construction found by experience 
to be workable; they can scarcely be deemed to be 
incompetent or irrelevant.  The meaning to be ascribed to an 
Act of Congress can only be derived from a considered 
weighing of every relevant aid to construction.48 
This purposive approach, or a variant of it, prevailed for several years in 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
In 1976, a unanimous Court in Train v. Colorado Public Interest 
Research Group, Inc., reversed a decision of the Second Circuit, in part, on 
the basis that the appeals court had refused to review the legislative history 
of the act in question.49  Speaking for the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
commented: 
To the extent that the Court of Appeals excluded 
reference to the legislative history of the FWPCA in 
discerning its meaning, the court was in error. As we have 
noted before: When aid to construction of the meaning of 
words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can 
be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the 
                                                                                                                          
46 Id. at 542–44 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
47 United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561–62 (1940). 
48 Id. at 562 (citation omitted). 
49 Train v. Colo. Pub. Int. Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 23–25 (1976). 
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words may appear on superficial examination.50 
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court appeared to be saying 
that the appeals court had committed legal error by espousing the view that 
the plain meaning rule, by its terms and coercive effect, prevented the court 
from looking at relevant legislative history. 
This review of U.S. Supreme Court cases on statutory interpretation 
also reveals a number of cases in which the Court appears to have taken a 
middle ground, adopting what could either be called a soft variant of the 
plain meaning rule or a linguistically slanted purposive approach.  They are 
cases in which the Court, while purporting to follow the plain meaning 
rule, also consulted extrinsic aids to confirm its view of the legislation 
under scrutiny.  In addition, they belied the notion that an integral part of 
the plain meaning rule, as traditionally understood, operates to prevent the 
court from consulting extrinsic materials.  For example, in Maine v. 
Thiboutot, Justice Brennan, in speaking for the majority, found certain 
language of the Civil Rights Act to have plain meaning, thus giving to 
private citizens the right to bring redress against the state.  But in finding 
the language of the legislation to be plain, the Court also reviewed the 
legislative history of the act to confirm its view.51  In dissent, Justice 
Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, rejected the Court’s alleged reliance 
on the plain meaning rule, espousing, instead, a more holistic approach, 
stating: 
[T]he ‘plain meaning’ rule is not as inflexible as the Court 
imagines.  Although plain meaning is always the starting 
point, this Court rarely ignores available aids to statutory 
construction.  We have recognized consistently that statutes 
are to be interpreted not only by a consideration of the words 
themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the 
purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the 
words were employed.52 
What is particularly noteworthy about this case is that neither the majority 
nor the dissent followed a narrow formulation of the plain meaning rule.53 
A year later, in Watt v. Alaska, the Court rejected the canon's 
application as a binding rule.54  In construing a portion of the statute at 
                                                                                                                          
50 Id. at 9–10 (internal quotations omitted). 
51 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4–11 (1980); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (illustrating that even though the Court took pains to attend to the 
plain meaning of the statute at hand, its reading comported with the clear legislative purpose). 
52 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 13–14 (Powell, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
53 Id. at 8–14.  Similarly, in Mohasco Corp v. Silver, the Court consulted legislative history while 
finding that the language of the statute in question was not ambiguous and that applying the language in 
accordance with its plain meaning would not lead to an absurd or futile result.  Mohasco Corp v. Silver, 
447 U.S. 807, 823–24 (1980). 
54 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265–67 (1981). 
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hand, the Court opined: 
We agree with the Secretary that [t]he starting point in 
every case involving construction of a statute is the language 
itself.  But ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face 
of a single statute need not end the inquiry.  This is because 
the plain-meaning rule is rather an axiom of experience than 
a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of 
persuasive evidence if it exists.  The circumstances of the 
enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that 
Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have 
their literal effect. 
Sole reliance on the plain language of § 401(a) would 
assume the answer to the question at issue . . . . Our 
examination of the legislative history is guided by another 
maxim: repeals by implication are not favored.  The intention 
of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.  We 
must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can do so 
while preserving their sense and purpose.55 
It is interesting that while the Watt majority engaged in weighing the 
value of applying the plain meaning rule with the application of other 
maxims of construction and, in this case, found other canons more 
persuasive than the application of plain meaning, the minority complained 
that the majority had disregarded the plain meaning rule.56  Watt 
demonstrates the willingness of the Court to consult other canons of 
construction as an aid to construction where, in the Court’s view, 
application of the plain meaning rule would cause an unintended outcome. 
History demonstrates, as well, the Court’s willingness to venture 
beyond the language of the statute to reveal a latent ambiguity in the 
meaning of otherwise plain language.  One example is the 1989 case of 
Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,57 in which Justice 
Brennan, speaking for the majority, called upon precedent in resolving the 
issue of statutory interpretation before the Court: 
As we said in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 
“[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, 
words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a 
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the 
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd 
results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the 
                                                                                                                          
55 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
56 Id. at 265; id. at 279–80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
57 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
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words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator 
intended to include the particular act.” 
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would 
compel an odd result, we must search for other evidence of 
congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.  The 
circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation, for 
example, may persuade a court that Congress did not intend 
words of common meaning to have their literal effect.  Even 
though, as Judge Learned Hand said, ”the words used, even 
in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most 
reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing,” 
nevertheless” it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and 
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the 
dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some 
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and 
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”  
Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly 
proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to 
fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress’ 
intention, since the plain-meaning rule is rather an axiom of 
experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude 
consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.58 
Finally, even though one rigid formulation of the rule posits that if a 
statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, a court is prohibited from 
consulting extrinsic sources, the Court has indicated that, under such 
circumstances, it has no need to look elsewhere.59  The language “no need” 
can fairly be read to reflect a matter of prudence and not limitation.  This 
view is consistent with Joseph Story’s formulation of the rule in his 
seminal work on American law: 
Where the words are plain and clear, and the sense distinct 
and perfect arising on them, there is generally no necessity to 
have recourse to other means of interpretation.  It is only 
when there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from other 
sources that interpretation has its proper office.  There may 
                                                                                                                          
58 Id. at 453–55 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892); 
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
59 For example, in Ex Parte Collett, the Court opined: “there is no need to refer to the legislative 
history where the statutory language is clear.”  Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949).  More 
recently, in Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, the Court, in overturning a 
circuit court’s finding of ambiguity, stated: “Given that the en banc Court of Appeals’ finding of textual 
ambiguity is wrong, there is no need to consult legislative history.”  Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132–33 (2002) (citation omitted). 
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be obscurity as to the meaning, from the doubtful character of 
the words used, from other clauses in the same instrument, or 
from an incongruity or repugnancy between the words and 
the apparent intention derived from the whole structure of the 
instrument or its avowed object.  In all such cases 
interpretation becomes indispensable.60 
When Justice Antonin Scalia joined the Court in 1986, he had an early 
impact on its interpretative process as well as on the tenor of the debate as 
he took aim at the Court’s habit of consulting legislative history to confirm 
its plain meaning analysis.61  For example, in a concurring opinion in INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, while agreeing with the court’s conclusion that the 
language of the statute at hand was clear, Justice Scalia took the majority 
to task for its searching review of the act’s legislative history to confirm its 
view, and he urged the Court to adopt textualism as its interpretive 
regimen.62  In spite of Justice Scalia’s objections, however, the Court has 
continued to look beyond the language of a statute under scrutiny on 
numerous occasions despite a determination of a statute’s plain meaning.63 
In a number of cases, Justice Scalia has urged the Court to adopt a 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation which, as noted, looks to 
statutory language and context for meaning.  On the other hand, Justices 
Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens64 have been the chief proponents of 
a purposive approach through which a court looks not only to statutory 
language but also to extrinsic resources, including legislative history, if 
doing so will aid in discerning legislative intent.65  A visit to recent Court 
                                                                                                                          
60 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 306 
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co. 5th ed. 1994) (1891) (footnote omitted). 
61 JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY? JUSTICE SCALIA IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS 105 (2007). 
62 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval of [questioning the 
legislature’s choice of language], that is to my mind an ill-advised deviation from the venerable 
principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect—at least in the 
absence of a patent absurdity.”). 
63 See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 482–83 (1992) (looking 
beyond the language of a statute to interpret that statute); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 159 
(1991) (rejecting an argument that the Court should construe a statute in the limited way that Congress 
intended when it enacted the exception); Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 
533, 540–41 (1991) (stating that an inquiry into legislative intent is not complete if there may be some 
ambiguity). 
64 See supra note 5.  In 2004, Justice Stevens, joined in concurrence by Justice Breyer, had this to 
say about the strict adherence to text:  
In recent years the Court has suggested that we should only look at legislative 
history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities.  It 
would be wiser to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available 
evidence of Congress’ true intent when interpreting its work product.  Common 
sense is often more reliable than rote repetition of canons of statutory construction.   
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65–66 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
65 As further noted infra Part III, underlying these different approaches are significantly different 
views of the role of the court and Congress in lawmaking.  Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer have 
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opinions finds Justice Stevens referring to textualism as “Justice Scalia’s 
cocktail-party textualism,”66 while Justice Scalia, in turn, assailed Justice 
Stevens’ purposive approach to interpreting the Controlled Substance Act, 
claiming that his “question-begging conclusion is obscured by a flurry of 
arguments that distort the statute and disregard settled principles of our 
interpretive jurisprudence.”67 
This brief overview of U.S. Supreme Court opinions demonstrates that 
there has been an ongoing dialogue on the Court regarding the proper 
methodology for interpreting statutes and, even among those Justices who 
claim adherence to the plain meaning rule, its manifestations have been 
various.68  When purporting to adhere to the plain meaning rubric, the 
Court has often consulted external sources to confirm its understanding of 
the meaning of the text and, at times, when the Court has declined to look 
beyond a statute’s language, it has done so for prudential reasons.  
Additionally, those Justices who have propounded a more purposive 
approach to interpretation have not found the need to renounce the plain 
meaning rule but, rather, have limited its usefulness by emphasizing that 
the plain language of a statute can become ambiguous in context.  None of 
them has claimed that the plain meaning rule is a legally binding 
constraint.  To the contrary, the Court has often repeated the notion that 
there can be no rule of law preventing the court from referring to external 
sources so long as the court remains true to its quest for legislative intent.  
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has never viewed the plain meaning rule 
as legally binding, and the many manifestations of the rule discussed in 
decisional law reflect that the Court has never perceived it as a one-size-
fits-all rule. 
IV.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN CONNECTICUT BEFORE COURCHESNE 
Until Courchesne, the Connecticut Supreme Court had not expressly 
adopted or rejected any particular analytical pathway to statutory 
                                                                                                                          
outlined their respective approaches to constitutional and statutory interpretation in separate texts.  See 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997) 
(advocating for a plain meaning interpretation of the Constitution and statutes); see also STEPHEN 
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5–6, 8 (2005) (discussing 
his belief that courts should interpret the Constitution with an emphasis on the democratic nature of 
government). 
66 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706–07 n.9 (2000). 
67 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 926 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
68 Bradford C. Mank appears to attribute the Court’s oscillation between theories of interpretation 
to changes in the composition of the court.  See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of 
Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to 
Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 531–34 (1998) (noting the differing views of the court from the 
nineteenth century to the current court).  Adrian Vermeule argues that changes in interpretative 
philosophies are the result of the dynamics between the courts and the legislature.  See Adrian 
Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV 149, 150–53 (2001) (discussing 
the impact of legislators and judges on the cycling mechanisms of interpretive theory). 
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interpretation.  Rather, a brief survey of its decisions suggests that the 
court’s approach has been varied and rarely dogmatic. 
In 1899, in Brown’s Appeal, the court took an approach that we have 
now come to regard as purposive.  The court opined: “The letter of a 
statute cannot prevail against the plainly indicated intent of the 
legislature,” even though finding in that instance that the letter of the 
statute and the intention of the legislature were in harmony.69 
In a decision apparently balancing the values of plain meaning and 
intent, the court, in D’Amato’s Appeal, found that strict adherence to the 
language of the statute under scrutiny was justified not only by the 
application of the rule but by reference to the evident purpose of the act.70 
A few years later, in Hazzard v. Gallucci, while the court incorporated 
some plain meaning language in its opinion, it suggested that strict 
adherence to the plain meaning of a statute should be subordinate to the 
court’s overarching need to discern legislative intent: 
The fundamental rule for the construction of statutes is to 
ascertain the intent of the Legislature.  This intention must be 
ascertained from this act itself, if the language is plain.  But, 
when the language used is doubtful in meaning, the true 
meaning may be ascertained by considering it in the light of 
all its provisions, the object to be accomplished by its 
passage, its title, pre-existing legislation upon the same 
subject, and other relevant circumstances.  
A statute is to be construed so as to carry out the intent of 
the Legislature, though such construction may seem contrary 
to the letter of the statute.71 
This unanimous opinion of the Hazzard court reflects a pragmatic view 
of interpretation, one by which the court first examines the language of the 
statute, but also evinces a willingness to review the policy of the legislation 
to insure that strict adherence to the language of the act would not defeat 
its evident purpose.  It is noteworthy in the context of this Article that the 
Hazzard court did not feel compelled to reject the plain meaning rule; it 
simply expressed a view of interpretation it believed was more likely to 
achieve its objective of applying the legislation in the manner the 
legislature intended. 
Similarly, in City of Stamford v. Town of Stamford, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court espoused the plain meaning rule but noted, nevertheless, 
that application of even the plain language of a statute could not prevail 
                                                                                                                          
69 Brown’s Appeal, 44 A. 22, 22 (Conn. 1899). 
70 D’Amato’s Appeal, 68 A. 445, 447 (Conn. 1907). 
71 Hazzard v. Gallucci, 93 A. 230, 231 (Conn. 1915) (quotation omitted). 
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over plainly indicated and definitely ascertained legislative intent.72  Citing 
the earlier Brown’s Appeal, the court commented: 
A statute is to be so construed as to carry out the intent of 
the Legislature, this [is] to be ascertained from the act itself, 
if the language is plain, otherwise by considering it in the 
light of all its provisions, the object sought to be 
accomplished, pre-existing legislation upon the same subject, 
and other relevant circumstances.  If this intent is plainly 
indicated and definitely ascertained, the letter of the statute 
may not prevail against it.73 
A few years later, in 1922, the court in Chambers v. Lowe took a 
purposeful analytical approach.  The court opined: “In determining the 
legislative intent we must look beyond the literal meaning of the words to 
the history of the law, its language considered in all its parts, the mischief 
it was designed to remedy, and the policy underlying it.”74 
Although there are other cases in the mid-twentieth century in which 
the Connecticut Supreme Court echoed the view that readily ascertained 
intent could trump plain language, during this same time period the court 
also expressed a more restrictive version of the plain meaning rule.  For 
example, in Stone v. Rosenfield, the court declined to depart from the plain 
meaning of the mechanics lien statute to extend its reach beyond the 
statutory words, despite the appeal of its application in the particular 
circumstances.75  In that case, the court acknowledged that it should 
construe the statute at hand in some way to provide value to the lien it 
provided for.  Nevertheless, the court concluded: “We cannot, however, 
depart from the plain meaning of the words of the statute.”76 
Similarly, in Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, the court stated: 
[W]here the plain meaning of a word is not contradicted by 
other provisions in the same instrument, that meaning is not 
to be disregarded because we believe the framers of the 
instrument could not have intended what they said.  We are 
bound by the legislative fiat as expressed in the statute.77 
The court has, however, frequently evinced a willingness to consult 
legislative history either to confirm the plain meaning of statutory language 
or to discover whether the language of a statute is at variance with its 
                                                                                                                          
72 City of Stamford v. Town of Stamford, 141 A. 891, 894–95 (Conn. 1928). 
73 Id. at 894 (citation omitted). 
74 Chambers v. Lowe, 169 A. 912, 913 (Conn. 1933). 
75 See Stone v. Rosenfield, 104 A.2d 545, 547 (Conn. 1954). 
76 Id. 
77 Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, 48 A.2d 369, 371 (Conn. 1946) (citation omitted). 
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intent.78  And, even while espousing adherence to a plain meaning rubric, 
the court has reflected a willingness to consult legislative history where the 
application of a statute’s seemingly plain and unambiguous language to a 
particular factual circumstance reveals a latent ambiguity.79 
Finally, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s history reflects an 
unwillingness to consult legislative history in certain circumstances but not 
a rule-bound preclusion from doing so.  This view was expressed, for 
example, in Anderson v. Ludgin, and cases cited therein, in which the court 
commented: “If the language of the statute is clear, it is assumed that the 
words themselves express the intent of the legislature and thus there is no 
need to construe the statute.”80 
This brief sampling of Connecticut cases reveals that, mainly, the court 
has dealt with statutory interpretation cases in a pragmatic, non-
ideologically driven manner.  From time to time the court has expressly 
adhered to the plain meaning rule, but, when it has done so, the contours of 
the rule have varied.  Additionally, when the court has taken a purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation without regard to plain meaning, one 
cannot reasonably conclude that such cases represent a departure from 
adherence to the rule because there is no indication that the language under 
scrutiny was either clear or unambiguous in those instances.  It simply may 
not have been in play. 
The varying results from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Connecticut 
Supreme Court could be seen as anomalous if the plain meaning rule is, 
indeed, a rule of law and not merely a guide to interpretation.81  As we 
have seen, however, the Supreme Court has often repeated with approval 
the notion that the rule is no more than an axiom of understanding.  This 
view is generally consistent with the role of canons of interpretation as 
                                                                                                                          
78 See Krafick v. Krafick, 663 A.2d 365, 371 (Conn. 1995) (“Nothing in the legislative history . . . 
indicates an intent to narrow the plain meaning of the term ‘property . . . .’” (citation omitted)); Town 
of North Haven v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 600 A.2d 1004, 1007–08 (Conn. 1991) (bolstering the 
court’s conclusion in light of the plain meaning of the statute by examining the legislative history); 
Univ. of Conn. v. FOIC, 585 A.2d 690, 693 (Conn. 1991) (noting that a review of legislative history 
suggests no reason to depart from plain meaning of the statute); Kneeland v. Adm’r, 88 A.2d 376, 378–
79 (Conn. 1952) (reviewing legislative history to determine whether there was any legislative intent to 
limit or modify the statute’s language from its evident meaning, despite the plain meaning of the statute 
under scrutiny). 
79 See Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d 242, 249 (Conn. 1996) (creating ambiguity by 
applying the statute to specific facts and also upon a review of the legislative history and the public 
policy of the statute under scrutiny); Univ. of Conn., 585 A.2d at 693 (announcing that the court may 
turn to the legislative history to resolve a latent ambiguity discovered upon attempting to apply 
apparently clear language of a statute to particular facts); State v. Champagne, 538 A.2d 193, 197 
(Conn. 1988) (allowing a court to resolve a statute’s latent ambiguity by reference to legislative history 
and the purpose of the statute at hand). 
80 Anderson v. Ludgin, 400 A.2d 712, 717 (Conn. 1978) (citations omitted). 
81 For purposes of this Article, there is little to be gained by arguing whether there is, in fact, only 
one true version of the rule, but that it has been unevenly applied or that the rule is simply a loosely 
based guide whose particular application depends on the circumstances at hand.  As a judge, I would 
like to think it is the latter, for the former would imply a reckless inattention to a solitary rule. 
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tools in judicial decision making. 
V.  PLAIN MEANING AS A CANON 
Canons of construction, including the plain meaning rule, have existed 
in one form or another as analytical tools for as long as there have been 
texts to interpret.  Linguistic canons, including a formulation of the plain 
meaning rule, were used as early as 500 B.C. as aids to understanding the 
Hindu text, Mimansa of Jaimini, and later to interpret the Talmudic 
commentary on the Old Testament and in medieval Christian 
commentary.82  Courts also used canons during America’s formation to 
keep legislation within the bounds of common sense and reason.83 
As interpretive guides, canons have been categorized into three types: 
(1) linguistic canons; (2) rules of deference, and; (3) substantive canons.84  
Linguistic canons generally deal with grammar, syntax and logical 
inference.85  The plain meaning rule is an example of a linguistic canon.86  
While the plain meaning rule is one of several linguistic canons, or canons 
of construction, it occupies a place of primacy among all canons because 
its application where statutory language is clear and unambiguous 
generally makes resorting to other canons of construction inappropriate.87  
For plain meaning adherents, therefore, application of the rule suggests that 
there is no need for interpretation if the statutory language at hand is 
clear.88 
Even though the plain meaning rule, and the canons of construction 
more generally, have a substantial pedigree, their value as useful tools of 
interpretation has received substantial criticism.  In a now famous essay on 
canons, Karl Llewellyn questioned their value as interpretative aides by 
                                                                                                                          
82 E.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 
1179, 1183 (1990). 
83 Alexander Hamilton viewed canons as judge-made rules of common sense and reason available 
to be used by judges to mitigate legislative excesses.  See John Choon Yoo, Marshall's Plan: The Early 
Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L. J. 1607, 1612 (1992) (discussing Hamilton’s 
view of canons as a judicial check on congressional power).  It should be noted, however, that 
Hamilton spoke during a period in which many judges still viewed themselves as guardians of the 
equity of the law, a view not universally held today. 
84 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 276 (1994). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 323. 
87 Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 247, 253–54 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]n 
interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one, cardinal canon before all others . . . [C]ourts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.  
When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is 
complete.”).  
88 Michael Sinclair, “Only A Sith Thinks Like That:” Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” Eight to 
Twelve, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1002, 1004, 1007 (2006–2007) [hereinafter Sinclair, Eight to Twelve] 
(observing that the plain meaning rule is “not so much a canon of construction as a condition on 
construction”). 
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attempting to demonstrate that for every canon there is a counter canon.89  
Llewellyn criticized the notion of legal formalism as over-reliant on 
canons, and instead of using canons as prescriptive guides, he urged the 
bench to use “situation sense,” or judgment that comes from legal and life 
experiences.90 
William Eskridge has characterized the canons of interpretation as “a 
homely collection of rules, principles and presumptions[,] . . . a collective 
security blanket for lawyers and judges because they combine 
predictability and legitimacy in statutory interpretation.”91  In this 
comment, it appears that Eskridge offers both positive and negative 
criticism of canons.  To be sure, the canons are a collection of judicially-
fashioned rules, principles, and presumptions intended to guide judicial 
decision making.  Proponents of canons argue that to the extent canons 
enhance predictability and give notice, they advance the rule of law, thus 
serving a more useful function than simply providing cover and legitimacy 
to judicial decision making.92  These advocates argue that if judges 
                                                                                                                          
89 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1949–1950).  While this 
article is credited with casting substantial doubt on the utility of canons, it has also received negative 
criticism.  In a series of articles, Michael Sinclair set out to demonstrate that Llewellyn’s “dueling 
pairs” of canons were not, in fact, contradictions of each other, but rather refinements and exceptions 
built into the rules.  Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” 
One to Seven, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 991–92 (2005–2006) [hereinafter Sinclair, One to Seven]; 
Sinclair, Eight to Twelve, supra note 88, at 1007.  Thus, for example, Sinclair argues that Llewellyn's 
assessment of the plain meaning rule as contradictory is incorrect.  While Llewellyn finds 
incompatibility in a rule that exhorts the reader not to look beyond the plain meaning of a statute unless 
literal interpretation would lead to an absurd or mischievous consequence or thwart manifest purpose, 
Sinclair concludes that the rule, read as a whole, simply gives primacy to clear text while allowing for 
resort to extrinsic sources in limited circumstances.  Id. at 1018.  Similarly, in his critique of 
Llewellyn's article, Justice Scalia argues that dueling canons are not, in fact, contradictory, but rather 
that the existence of exceptions to canons simply demonstrates that a canon's exhortations or 
prescriptions are not absolute.  SCALIA, supra note 65, at 27. 
90 See Llewellyn, supra note 89, at 401 (“[T]o make any canon take hold in a particular instance, 
the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon: The 
good sense of the situation and the simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, 
by tenable means, out of the statutory language.”). 
91 ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 84, at 275; see also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Natural Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7, 10 (2005) (noting 
that canons “encompass a set of background norms and conventions” and serve the “dual role of 
making interpretation more predictable,” thereby encouraging congress to draft laws in a more 
consistent and precise manner); Michael Sinclair, The Proper Treatment of “Interpretative Choice” in 
Statutory Decision-Making, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 389, 453 (2002) (arguing that though courts 
should be more selective in employing canons on a statute-specific basis, a canon’s primary function is 
to provide consistency and continuity and as a result of their use, congress may employ language more 
carefully in anticipation of how judges are likely to interpret a statute). 
92 As noted by Judge Posner: 
[C]anons do not constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to 
create the appearance that his decisions are constrained.  A standard defense of 
judicial activism, in the words of a defender, is that it is, in most instances, not 
activism at all.  Courts do not relish making such hard decisions and certainly do not 
encourage litigation on social or political problems.  But . . . the federal judiciary . . . 
has the paramount and the continuing duty to uphold the law.  By making statutory 
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consistently utilize certain canons in the task of statutory interpretation, 
that fact will, over time, become known to legislative bodies and provide 
an understanding to legislatures of the manner in which their enactments 
are going to be read.93  For example, the canon that maintains that penal 
statutes are to be construed narrowly and remedial statutes broadly serves 
this purpose.  Some argue that the consistent use of canons by judicial 
decision makers also enhances effective governance by limiting judicial 
discretion and, thereby, enhancing legislative accountability.94 
On the other hand, critics of canons have argued that canons are of 
little use because a judge can always find a canon to support a particular 
outcome, and that reliance on them is a poor substitute for the sound 
reasoning required for actual judging.95  But if the canons of construction 
are no more than norms or conventions, as one scholar observed,96 or 
simply “wise saws backed by experience and intuition”97 and not rules of 
law, how do they accomplish their purpose of providing notice and 
continuity?  In other words, if a canon is not a rule of law, the question 
arises whether an appellate court's use or rejection of a canon has any 
precedential value either on the court or in relation to lower courts. 
As a general proposition, the policy of stare decisis binds the deciding 
court and all lower courts in the same system to the court's holding in a 
statutory construction case.  In most cases of statutory interpretation, 
                                                                                                                          
interpretation seem mechanical rather than creative, the canons conceal, often from 
the reader of the judicial opinion and sometimes from the writer, the extent to which 
the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting a statute or a constitutional 
provision.  
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 800, 816–17 (1983) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
93 Adrian Vermeule refers to canons as “prepackaged default rules” and argues that the principal 
value of canons to the legislature is their predictability.  Adrian Vermeule, Interpretative Choice, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 140–41 (2000).  For Vermeule, it is more important that courts adopt and 
consistently apply a known set of canons than that the canons actually be correct.  Id. 
94 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 
154 (1990). 
95 In a dissenting opinion in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, Justice Stevens castigated 
the majority’s use of a canon of interpretation giving deference to the administrative interpretation of a 
statute where he believed the language of the statute was abundantly clear.  Young v. Cmty. Nutrition 
Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 985–88 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He noted, “The Court, correctly self-
conscious of the limits of the judicial role, employs a reasoning so formulaic that it trivializes the art of 
judging.”  Id. at 988.  Justice Stevens cited with approval Justice Frankfurter’s view that statutory 
interpretation is not “a ritual to be observed by unimaginative adherence to well-worn professional 
phrases . . . . Nor can canons of construction save us from the anguish of judgment.”  Id. at 988 
(quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 
(1947)); see also Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain Meaning Rule” and Statutory 
Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1317 (1975) (arguing that 
the plain meaning rule had outlived its usefulness not only because of its inconsistent application but 
because the use or rejection of the rule does not answer the deeper question of the court’s role in the 
legislative process; such questions cannot be answered by the simple-minded formulae often advanced, 
including the plain meaning rule). 
96 Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 91, at 7. 
97 Sinclair, One to Seven, supra note 89, at 921. 
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however, the analytical route taken by the court is at most dicta and not 
part of its holding.98  Presumably, the U.S. Supreme Court or a state's 
highest court could embed a canon of construction into its procedure 
pursuant to its supervisory authority.99  But, more likely, lower courts 
follow the lead of a system’s highest court in this regard as a matter of 
deference.100 
As to the U.S. Supreme Court, history makes it clear that the Court's 
use or rejection of a canon is not a matter of stare decisis.  If it were, the 
Court’s ongoing debate regarding statutory interpretation would be marked 
by claims that the last utterance on the subject is binding on the Court.  
But, to the contrary, the claim of stare decisis as to adherence to a statute’s 
plain meaning has not been made in any of the Court’s statutory 
interpretation cases.   
As noted in the review of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the debate 
regarding the utility of the plain meaning rule has largely been superseded 
by the ongoing debate between textualists and purposivists concerning 
their competing approaches to statutory interpretation.101  Advocates of 
both approaches claim that their quest is to determine legislative intent in 
enacting the statute at hand.102 
                                                                                                                          
98 “Even the English courts, which hold to a doctrine of stare decisis more rigid than our own, 
hold that obiter dicta are in no wise controlling.  Surely the rule of stare decisis should not preclude 
consideration of whether such dicta were originally supported by logic and have withstood the test of 
time.”  Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 162 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
99 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated: “This Court has supervisory authority over the federal 
courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in 
those tribunals.”  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 272–73 (2004) (quoting 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000)).  As the U.S. Supreme Court occupies a 
supervisory position vis-à-vis lower federal courts, so too must a state's highest court in regard to the 
state’s lower courts.  See State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 457–60 (2008) (describing how state high 
courts review and correct the legal errors of the lower courts, which have “general jurisdiction with 
ultimate authority over the trial of causes”). 
100 One scholar has observed that if a higher court’s use of a particular interpretive methodology 
does not have the force of stare decisis, the higher court’s view of the correct analytical path to 
statutory interpretation does have powerful socio-psychological impact.  Sinclair, supra note 91, at 404 
& n.68. 
101 Justice Jackson first used the word textualism in his 1952 concurrence in which he favored a 
more flexible interpretive theory allowing “some latitude of interpretation for changing times” over the 
“rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism.”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) [hereinafter Steel Seizure]. 
102 See Mank, supra note 68, at 528, for a discussion of the parameters of the competing theories 
of statutory interpretation.  Mank asserts that textualism is an outgrowth of the plain meaning 
jurisprudence and that its more recent formulation, new textualism, permits resort beyond the text of a 
statute to the statutory scheme in order to glean legislative intent.  Id. at 534.  In his treatise on statutory 
interpretation, William Eskridge, Jr. makes the case for an intentionalist approach to interpretation.  He 
argues that this approach permits the court to update statutes to make them germane to situations not 
within the contemplation of original drafters but within the spirit of the law.  ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 
84, at 276; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict 
Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 410 (1994) (discussing new textualism’s 
willingness to look at the broader statutory context of an enactment to determine a statute's meaning 
and contrasting this approach, espoused by Justice Scalia, with the older more rigid form of textualism 
that was more akin to the plain meaning rule). 
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As Judge John Walker has indicated, these varying schools of 
interpretative theory reflect not merely differences among jurists on how to 
read statutes, but also one’s concept of the law and view of a judge’s role 
in the interpretative process.103  Thus, in any case in which there are 
competing opinions, the statutory interpretation dispute may reveal a 
chasm between judges about their respective roles or lack of roles in the 
lawmaking process. 
While the rule that the meaning of a statute should be gleaned from its 
clear language may be rooted in linguistics, its current rationale as 
incorporated in a textualist approach includes the notion that judges should 
not seek to take part in the legislative process.  According to this theory, a 
judge who forsakes the clear language of a statute in order to carry out its 
intent as revealed by its legislative history is acting in a constitutionally 
impermissible manner because, by acting in such a way, the judge is 
participating in the law making process. For a textualist, therefore, a 
judge’s role in statutory interpretation is to determine what the legislature 
said, not what it intended to say by the words it used, because judges have 
no role in the legislative process except to state the law.  Additionally, 
textualism rests on the idea that once a bill is enacted, it has its own 
autonomous existence apart from the negotiations that led up to it and, 
therefore, resorting to legislative history to understand the meaning of even 
an unclear statute is inappropriate. 
On the other hand, judges and theorists who adhere to a purposive 
approach believe that language is inherently indeterminate and therefore, 
they argue that consulting extrinsic sources in order to further understand 
the import of even clear language is always appropriate.104  A useful 
exposition of this view can be found in Judge Posner’s comment that, 
[J]udges realize in their heart of hearts that the superficial 
clarity to which they are referring when they call the meaning 
of a statute ‘plain’ is treacherous footing for interpretation.  
They know that statutes are purposive utterances and that 
language is a slippery medium in which to encode a purpose.  
They know that legislatures, including the Congress of the 
United States, often legislate in haste, without considering 
fully the potential application of their words to novel 
                                                                                                                          
103 See John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on the 
Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 205–06 (2001) (discussing two competing 
conceptions of statutory law).  Judge Walker notes that one view holds that the law is complete once 
legislation is enacted.  Another holds that the command of the law is not fully determined until applied 
in the process of adjudication.  Id.  Under the second view, Judge Walker notes, a statute should be read 
so as to give effect to its purpose in an interpretative process in which the court undertakes the role of a 
law giver or creator rather than a law communicator.  Id. at 206. 
104 For a useful discussion of the competing approaches, see John F. Manning, Competing 
Presumptions about Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2009–12 (2006). 
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settings.105 
In assessing the state of the debate between the textualist and 
purposive interpretative theories, some commentators have observed that 
one thrust of textualism is to limit the reach of legislation by narrowly 
confining statutory terms, while a purposive approach tends to broaden 
legislation because the willingness to consider unexpressed legislative 
intent has an expanding effect.106 
Despite sometimes fierce debate between these two theories, some 
commentators argue that there is a narrowing of these approaches.  This 
narrowing, they contend, has occurred because the form of textualism 
espoused by Justice Scalia—known as new textualism—allows resort to 
the broader statutory context as an aid to interpretation and adherents of a 
purposive approach acknowledge the primacy of statutory language.107  
Researchers have found, by reviewing decisions, that there is no 
statistically demonstrated difference in outcomes between cases decided 
using textualist theory and those involving purposive reasoning.108 
No matter the views of commentators, the dialogue continues to 
percolate in U.S. Supreme Court statutory interpretation jurisprudence.  As 
can be seen from the actual decisions of the Court, the doctrinal debate 
continues.  On the state level, however, legislatures have joined the fray in 
an assertion of legislative primacy.  Connecticut is the most recent example 
of this development. 
VI.  CONNECTICUT’S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO COURCHESNE AND 
OTHER STATES' ADOPTION OF PLAIN MEANING STATUTES 
The Connecticut Supreme Court officially released its opinion in 
Courchesne on March 11, 2003.  Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly 
attached an amendment regarding the plain meaning rule to an unrelated 
bill already pending before its judiciary committee.109  The judiciary 
committee accepted the bill, as amended, on April 16, 2003, with 
                                                                                                                          
105 Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir.1989). 
106 See Mank, supra note 68, at 527–28 (arguing that conservative judges tend to employ a 
textualist analysis as a means to limit the reach of the legislative branch and thus minimize the role of 
government); see also GERKEN, supra note 61, at 105 (discussing the parameters and history of the 
dueling theories as applied in the United States Supreme Court). 
107 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 36, 69 
(2006) (arguing that doctrinal similarities exist but are rarely acknowledged).  But see Manning, supra 
note 5, at 75 (disputing Molot’s claim that more joins the doctrinal divide than separates them). 
108 Daniel Farber has suggested that, “[I]f every judge in the country took a sincere oath of 
allegiance to textualism and formalism—or to dynamic interpretation and pragmatism—it seems quite 
possible that little or no detectable effect would exist on the outcomes of statutory cases.”  Daniel A. 
Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 1432 
(1999–2000). 
109 Proposed H.B. 5033 Before the Conn. S. Judiciary Comm., 2003 Sess. (2003), 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/juddata/chr/2003JUD00331-R001300-CHR.htm; Conn. S. Judiciary 
Comm. Bill 5033, 2003 Sess. (2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/tob/h/2003HB-05033-R01-HB.htm.  
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unanimous support.  A search of the brief legislative history of the bill 
confirms its genesis.110 
During the public hearing on the bill, judiciary committee co-chair, 
State Senator Andrew McDonald, a principal supporter of the bill, 
responded to testimony opposed to the bill: 
As a general proposition, I think I would agree with you that 
it’s important for the Legislature to step back and allow the 
judiciary to undertake its review and construction of statutes 
in accordance with normally accepted principles of statutory 
construction. 
I do have to say, though, that the Courchesne decision 
seemed to me to be such a remarkable departure from 
normally accepted rules of statutory construction as to say 
that what the Legislature does or does not put into its statutes 
ultimately will not control the court’s determination of the 
import of those statutes. 
And it was a fairly broad proposition, as I have read this 
lengthy decision . . . . It’s a pretty astonishing proposition 
that the plain language of a statute is not necessarily 
determinative of what the statute is intended to accomplish.111 
Additionally, when the bill was taken up by the State Senate, Senator 
McDonald stated the following in favor of its passage: 
[T]his bill comes to us in the wake of a Supreme Court 
decision recently issued by the Connecticut Supreme Court in 
State v. Courchesne which raised an interesting issue and one 
that the Judiciary Committee thought was important for the 
Legislature to debate and vote upon. 
Historically, the courts of the State of Connecticut have 
interpreted our statutes under several rules of statutory 
construction.  But one of the prime rules that has always 
guided court interpretation of statutes is something called the 
plain meaning rule.112 
And without going into great detail about the plain 
meaning rule, it essentially says that if a statute is on its face, 
clear and unambiguous, and interpreting it in light of that 
clear and unambiguous language would not yield absurd or 
                                                                                                                          
110 H.B. 5033, 2003 Sess. (Conn. 2003). 
111 Hearing on H.B. 5033 Before the Conn. S. Judiciary Comm., 2003 Sess. (Mar. 31, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Andrew McDonald). 
112 It is noteworthy that Courchesne was the first case in Connecticut to use the phrase “plain 
meaning rule.”  State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 580 (Conn. 2003). 
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unworkable results, the courts are not permitted to look 
beyond the language in the statute itself for purposes of 
determining what our legislative intent was in adopting that 
legislation.113 
In closing, Senator McDonald made explicit his intentions in proposing the 
bill: 
And so, in case this bill does actually pass in 
accordance with the House’s passage let me be very clear 
for the purpose of legislative intent, that if this bill passes 
it is the intent to overrule the portion of State v. 
Courchesne which recanted or retrenched from the plain 
meaning rule under the rules of statutory construction.114 
The bill passed in the House by a vote of 144–0 and, on May 29, 2003, 
by a vote of 20–16, in the Senate.115  General Statutes § 1-2z, titled “Plain 
Meaning Rule,” states: 
The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be 
ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its 
relationship to other statutes.  If, after examining such text 
and considering such relationship, the meaning of such 
text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or 
unworkable results, extra-textual evidence of the meaning 
of the statute shall not be considered.116 
A fair reading of this legislative history reveals that the judiciary 
committee believed Courchesne represented a radical departure from 
normative statutory interpretation and that the court’s rejection of the plain 
meaning rule reflected judicial disrespect for legislative primacy in law 
making.117  As a consequence of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                          
113 Hearing on H.B. 5033 Before the Conn. S. Judiciary Comm., 2003 Sess. (May 29, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Andrew McDonald). 
114 Id. 
115 H.B.-5033, 2003 Sess. (Conn. 2003), House Vote Tally, http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/ 
vote/h/2003HV-00159-R00HB05033-HV.htm; H.B.-5033, 2003 Sess. (Conn. 2003), Senate Vote 
Tally, http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/vote/s/2003SV-00386-R00HB05033-SV.htm.  Even though it is 
plain from this legislative history that the purpose of the General Assembly in enacting a plain meaning 
statute was to overrule Courchesne, it is noteworthy that nowhere in the discussion is there any 
indication of displeasure with the substantive holding of Courchesne.  In short, the General Assembly 
reacted to the perceived assault on its legislative primacy by the Court in Courchesne, but not to the 
decision itself.  Hearing on H.B. 5033, supra note 111.  
116 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2007). 
117 This is especially evident in Senator McDonald's declaration, in reference to the General 
Assembly, that, “We are the law.  We have the right in our collective will to establish what the law of 
the state of Connecticut is.  And we have the opportunity in this Chamber to pass legislation dictating 
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rejection of any version of the plain meaning rule, the General Assembly 
enacted legislation limiting, as a matter of law, the analytical tools 
available to judges in the interpretation of statutes.  In doing so, even 
though it was the legislature’s evident intent merely to overrule 
Courchesne, the General Assembly adopted a rigid one–size–fits–all 
formulation of the rule not historically applied in either Connecticut or 
U.S. Supreme Court decisional law.118 
As noted, in the aftermath of Courchesne, Connecticut became the 
eighth state to legislate a version of the plain meaning rule.  In this regard, 
this Article distinguishes plain meaning statutes from plain language 
statutes on the basis that the latter generally contain benign statements that 
words and phrases are to be construed according to common usage.  Such 
language statutes are numerous.119 
                                                                                                                          
how the courts shall operate.”  Hearing on H.B. 5033 Before the Conn. S. Judiciary Comm., 2003 Sess. 
(2003) (statement of Sen. Andrew McDonald), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/juddata/chr/2003JUD 
00331-R001300-CHR.htm. 
118 Further indication that the General Assembly’s swift response to Courchesne had more to do 
with the legislative body’s relationship to the judiciary than the analytical path taken by the court in 
Courchesne can be found in a legislative report made available to the General Assembly.   
CHRISTOPHER REINHART, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND 
STATE V. COURCHESNE (May 6, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-R-0424.htm.  
This report demonstrates that in several post-Courchesne opinions, while the same justices who 
authored the majority and dissent in Courchesne continued their disagreement regarding the efficacy of 
the plain meaning rule, their disagreements arose in the context of concurring and not dissenting 
opinions.  In other words, the question of which analytical approach to take had no impact on the actual 
decisions of the court.  These results can be seen as an indication that one's ideological preference 
regarding statutory interpretation may often bear no relationship to decisional outcomes. 
119 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1 (2007) (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to 
the commonly approved usage of the language.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-02 (2008) (“Words used in 
any statute are to be understood in the ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears, but 
any words explained in this code are to be understood as thus explained.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25 § 25-1 
(2008) (“Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, except when a contrary 
intention plainly appears, and except also that the words hereinafter explained are to be understood as 
thus explained.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-101 (2008) (”Words and phrases shall be read in 
context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.  Words and phrases that 
have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be 
construed accordingly.”); KY. REV. STAT. § 446.080(4) (2008) (“All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to the common and approved usage of language, but technical words and phrases, 
and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed 
according to such meaning.”); N.H. REV. STAT. § 21:2 (2008) (“Words and phrases shall be construed 
according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and 
such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and 
understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”); N.M. STAT. § 12-2A-2 (2008) 
(“Unless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being construed, its meaning is determined by 
its context, the rules of grammar and common usage. A word or phrase that has acquired a technical or 
particular meaning in a particular context has that meaning if it is used in that context.”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1.42 (West 2008) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according 
to the rules of grammar and common usage.  Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or 
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.”); 
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a)–(b) (Vernon 2008) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context 
and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have 
acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be 
construed accordingly.”). 
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But while plain language statutes express legislative intent that words 
be given their ordinary meaning, plain meaning statutes purport to tell 
courts how to engage in the process of statutory interpretation.  As noted 
infra, in addition to Connecticut, the legislatures of eight other states—
Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oregon, and Pennsylvania—have passed statutes directing the courts of 
those states to limit their statutory analysis to the text of a statute when the 
text is unambiguous.  
Delaware’s legislature passed a plain meaning statute under 
circumstances similar to Connecticut.  As a reaction to the Delaware 
Supreme Court's statutory analysis in Evans v. State,120 that state’s 
legislature adopted the following statute: 
(a) Delaware judicial officers may not create or amend 
statutes, nor second-guess the soundness of public policy 
or wisdom of the General Assembly in passing statutes, 
nor may they interpret or construe statutes and other 
Delaware law when the text is clear and unambiguous. 
(b) Notwithstanding § 203 of Title 11, Delaware 
judicial officers shall strictly interpret or construe 
legislative intent. 
(c) Delaware judicial officers shall use the utmost 
restraint when interpreting or construing the laws of this 
State.121 
The language of the act evinces the Delaware legislature’s disapproval 
of its Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v. State because the legislature 
perceived that the court’s statutory analysis deviated from the clear text 
and the legislative intent of the statute at issue.122 
New Mexico’s plain meaning statute contains the heading “Primacy of 
Text” and provides: “The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential 
source of its meaning.”123  North Dakota’s statute provides: “When the 
wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not 
to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”124  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                          
120 Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 552–53 (Del. 2005). 
121 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 5403 (2005), invalidated by Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 550 (Del. 
2005). 
122 H.B. 31, 143d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005). 
123 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-19 (West 2008). 
124 N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-05 (2008).  In addition to its plain meaning statute, North Dakota 
also has a statute outlining the sources a court may consult in construing an ambiguous statute.  N.D. 
CENT. CODE. § 1-02-39 (1967). 
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Louisiana’s legislature directed the courts as follows: “When the wording 
of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursing its spirit.”125  Minnesota’s plain 
meaning statute provides in relevant part: 
The object of all interpretation and construction of 
laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 
legislature.  Every law shall be construed, if possible, to 
give effect to all its provisions. 
When the words of a law in their application to an 
existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the 
letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext 
of pursuing the spirit.126  
Finally, Pennsylvania’s statute is almost identical to Minnesota’s 
providing:  
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of 
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 
General Assembly.  Every statute shall be construed, if 
possible, to give effect to all its provisions. 
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from 
all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under 
the pretext of pursuing its spirit.127 
Both the legislatures of Montana and Oregon have adopted statutes 
circumscribing a judge’s role when interpreting statutes and explicitly 
preventing the judge from inserting additional substance.  These states 
have adopted this identical language regarding the construction of a statute: 
[T]he office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare 
what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to 
insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been 
inserted. Where there are several provisions or particulars, 
such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will 
give effect to all.128 
All of these state plain meaning statutes are prescriptive and 
                                                                                                                          
125 LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 1:4 (2008). 
126 MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2003). 
127 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (2008). 
128 MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-101 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2008). 
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proscriptive.  They direct and limit a traditional judicial function in a 
manner that suggests a mistrust of the judiciary.  Moreover, they represent 
an assertion of legislative primacy in the function of statutory 
interpretation. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As a canon of construction, the plain meaning rule has taken a strange 
journey.  First used as an approach to understanding legislative intent, its 
focus on text has now become the core of a theory of construction that has 
acquired significance beyond the process of interpretation, one that 
concerns, more broadly, the role of a judge in a statutory era.  Furthermore, 
as the plain meaning rule concerns the interpretation of statutes, it, like 
other canons that guide statutory interpretation, has increasingly attracted 
the political attention of state legislatures. 
In the early years of the Democracy, the Marshall Court’s orientation 
toward statutory law was as a faithful agent whose purpose was to 
effectuate Congressional intent.  Application of the plain meaning rule, as 
a canon of construction, was one vehicle utilized by the court for this 
purpose.  This rule has been favored by those who believe that language is 
essentially determinate and that legislation is complete once enacted.  It 
has been eschewed as wooden by those who view all language as 
indeterminate and who believe in the notion that the enactment of a statute 
marks only the beginning of its life.129  As noted, a review of the literature 
and decisional law reflects this ongoing debate. 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, however, the discussion 
about the proper method of statutory interpretation has taken on a political 
dimension implicating the role of the judiciary in the legislative process.  
Now, although the debate may speak in terms of the most effective manner 
to implement legislative intent, the forces that drive the debate have as 
much to do with the different notions of the judicial role in legislation as 
with interpretative methodology. 
Justice Scalia is perhaps the most visible proponent of a textual 
approach to interpretation, one which he believes most fits the judicial role 
in a constitutional democracy where judges have no business participating 
in the creation of policy and which is premised on the idea that once 
legislation is enacted, it is complete.130 
Conversely, there are those who view statutory interpretation as 
dynamic and believe that the court has a partnership role in the legislative 
                                                                                                                          
129 Walker, Jr., supra note 103, at 205–06. 
130 See SCALIA, supra note 65, at 13 (arguing that it is wrong for a common law judge to ask, 
“What is the most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any impediments to the achievement 
of that result be evaded?”). 
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process.131  Adherents of this view generally subscribe to the belief that the 
role of the court in statutory cases is to discern the purpose of a statute and 
to apply it to the situation at hand, even if there is no evidence that such an 
application was actually contemplated at the time of enactment.  In this 
light, legislation is dynamic, not static.  It continues its relevance well 
beyond the period of enactment because it is updated from time to time by 
judicial interpretation.  For those who adhere to this belief, exclusive 
reliance on a statute's plain language is not an aid to discerning a statute's 
purpose.132 
While scholars and jurists have debated their varying views on the 
proper mode of statutory interpretation and, by implication, their respective 
views of the relationship between the judicial and legislative bodies, state 
legislatures, beginning in the mid-twentieth century, have introduced a new 
dynamic into the discussion by enacting proscriptive and prescriptive plain 
meaning statutes.  The imposition of legislative direction in the area of 
statutory interpretation could have significant ramifications for judicial 
decision making because the legislation passed to date reflects no 
sensitivity to differences among classes of statutes, and because state plain 
meaning statutes generally purport to limit the scope of a court's inquiry 
into legislative intent. 
As to the first point, there will, of course, be no difficulty in the case of 
statutory language that is plain and unambiguous on its face and where no 
ambiguity, absurdity or lack of workability is revealed by application of 
the statute to the particular facts at hand.  But statutes with clear messages 
are not often the focus of judicial decision making.  The fertile area for 
interpretation involves cases in which the statutory language is either 
patently unclear or ambiguous, or where application of the statute to a 
particular set of facts reveals an ambiguity or impracticality in application.  
In either situation, neither the plain meaning canon nor a legislative 
iteration of it is likely to aid judicial reasoning. 
Nevertheless, there will be situations in which a plain meaning statute 
that prohibits resort to extrinsic sources as an aid to interpretation may be 
                                                                                                                          
131 In a far-reaching article, Aharon Barak, the former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, 
espouses the idea that Supreme Court justices are not merely agents of the legislature but “junior 
partners” in the legislative process.  Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court 
in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 34–35 (2002).   Barak states that when engaged in the process 
of statutory interpretation, a judge has a far grander role than simply stating the law.  He asks 
rhetorically:  
But within the range of possible linguistic meanings, and taking account—to 
different degrees—of the intentions of the authors of the constitution and statutes, 
why do we not recognize that when judges interpret the constitution and statutes—
just as when they create the common law—they have a role to play in protecting 
democracy and in bridging the gap between society and law? 
Id. at 48. 
132 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 84, at 5–6 (noting that statutory interpretation need not 
adhere to that which the legislature endorsed). 
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problematic, depending on the nature of the statute.133  In a helpful article 
on this subject, Peter Tiersma has suggested that the choice of 
interpretative tools employed by a court should depend on the nature of the 
statute under scrutiny and the audience to whom it is directed.134  As 
Tiersma notes, statutes directed to the public in general should be clear and 
comprehensive.135  It is relatively easy to see that when confronting a penal 
statute, it would be appropriate for a court to base its interpretation solely 
on the language of a statute without resort to extrinsic aids—such as 
legislative history—simply because of the due process considerations 
applicable to penal laws.  Reciprocally, as argued by Tiersma, if the statute 
at hand relates principally to the work of an administrative agency, the 
fullest understanding of the latest iteration of a statute pertinent to the 
agency’s work may be best understood in the context of the statute's entire 
legislative history.136  While these examples may represent two opposite 
ends of a spectrum, Tiersma’s central thesis is that no one path to statutory 
interpretation fits all statutes and courts should employ interpretative 
analyses appropriate to the statutory contexts they confront.  Legislative 
proscriptions applicable to all statutes may operate to prevent a court from 
following Tiersma’s sound advice. 
Ultimately, the task of a court in statutory interpretation is to apply the 
law to the circumstances at hand.  Whether the increasing involvement of 
legislatures in the arena of statutory interpretation will prove to have an 
impact on correct judicial decision making in statutory interpretation cases 
remains to be seen.  It is plain, nevertheless, that the ancient art of statutory 
interpretation has become a topic of political discourse and, increasingly, 
the focus of legislative activity. 
                                                                                                                          
133 For example, if the form of the plain meaning rule adopted by the Connecticut General 
Assembly were applicable to the facts in Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), 
it is likely the outcome would be different.  There, the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to interpret 
a Congressional enactment that prohibited the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under 
contract or agreement to perform “labor or service of any kind” in the United States.  Id. at 458.  
Notwithstanding the broad language of the statute, the Court determined that the law did not prevent 
the Church from contracting with a British citizen to serve as its minister. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looked beyond the admittedly clear language of the statute.  The Court found:  
We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be 
remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of the 
committee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress was 
simply to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labor. 
Id. at 465.  The Court concluded:  “It is the duty of the courts, under those circumstances, to say that, 
however broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the 
intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.”  Id. at 472. 
134 Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy and Statutory Interpretation, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 431, 434 (2001); see also Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why it 
Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning 
Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 965–66, 998 (2005) (critiquing the one–size–fits–all approach to 
statutory interpretation). 
135 Tiersma, supra note 134, at 431. 
136 Id. at 434. 
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In Connecticut, although the legislature’s stated goal was to overrule 
Courchesne, the enactment of the plain meaning statute did not restore the 
method of statutory interpretation to the status quo that existed prior to the 
release of that opinion.  Instead, without regard to the ongoing debate 
between the schools of statutory interpretation, the legislature adopted a 
rigid formulation of the plain meaning rule akin to Justice Scalia’s 
textualism.  One can hardly ignore the irony that such a textual approach is 
most often associated with political conservatism because, it has been 
argued, a textual approach tends to limit the reach of legislation while a 
purposive approach yields a more expansive reach for legislation.137  
Therefore, it could be argued that the enactment of plain meaning statutes 
may be counterproductive for a legislative body desiring that its legislation 
be given the broadest possible effect. 
The legislative renewal of the plain meaning rule, in any form, reveals 
an inter–branch tension that may have some effect on the ongoing debate 
about the role of judges in a statutory era.138  However, in the process of 
adjudication, once a determination has been made that a statute is either 
unclear or ambiguous, or that its application would reap an unworkable 
result, a court will likely carry out its interpretative function guided by its 
own best adjudicative judgment, resorting or not to extrinsic sources, 
unaffected by the once moribund, but newly resuscitated, plain meaning 
rule. 
                                                                                                                          
137 GERKEN, supra note 61, at 313–15. 
138 [E]ven generalized restatements from time to time may not be wholly wasteful.  Out 
of them may come a sharper rephrasing of the conscious factors of interpretation; 
new instances may make them more vivid, but also disclose more clearly their 
limitations.  Thereby we may avoid rigidities which, while they afford more precise 
formulas, do so at the price of cramping the life of law.  To strip the task of judicial 
reading of statutes of rules that partake the mysteries of a craft serves to reveal the 
true elements of our problem.  It defines more accurately the nature of the 
intellectual responsibility of a judge and thereby subjects him to more relevant 
criteria of criticism.  Rigorous analysis also sharpens the respective duties of 
legislature and courts in relation to the making of laws and to their enforcement.   
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 544–45 
(1947). 
